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Abstract
This paper examines how much the central bank should adjust the interest rate in response to real
exchange rate ﬂuctuations. The paper ﬁrst demonstrates in a two-country Dynamic Stochastic General
Equilibrium (DSGE) model, that the home bias in consumption is important to duplicate the exchange
rate volatility and exchange rate disconnect documented in the data. When home bias is high, the shock
to Uncovered Interest-rate Parity (UIP) can substantially drive up exchange rate volatility while leaving
the volatility of real macroeconomic variables, such as GDP, almost untouched. The model predicts that
the volatility of the real exchange rate relative to that of GDP increases with the extent of home bias.
This relation is supported by the data. A second-order accurate solution method is employed to ﬁnd
the optimal operational monetary policy rule. Our model suggests that the monetary authority should
not seek to vigorously stabilize exchange rate ﬂuctuations. In particular, when the central bank does
not take a strong stance against the inﬂation rate, exchange rate stabilization may induce substantial
welfare loss. The model does not detect welfare gain from the international monetary cooperation, which
extends Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ’s (2002) ﬁndings to a DSGE model.
JEL Classiﬁcations: E52, F31, F41
Keywords: Home bias, Exchange rate volatility, Exchange rate disconnect, Optimal monetary policy
∗I am grateful to Charles Engel for his priceless advice and encouragement. I would like to thank Menzie Chinn, Vasco
Curdi´ a, Kevin Grier, Bruce Hansen, Ben Keen, Robert Kollmann, Nelson Mark, Yongseok Shin, John Taylor, Ken West, and
many seminar and conference participants for discussions and comments. I also want to thank the co-editor Michael Melvin
and an anonymous referee for close reading and constructive criticism. All views are those of the author and do not necessarily
reﬂect the views of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas or the Federal Reserve System.
†Email: jian.wang@dal.frb.org Oﬃce address: Research Department, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, 2200 N. Pearl Street,
Dallas, TX 75201 Phone: (214) 922-6471.1 Introduction
Many countries adopted a monetary policy regime deﬁned by John Taylor as a trinity: (1) a ﬂexible exchange
rate, (2) an inﬂation target, and (3) a monetary policy rule. The role of the exchange rate in the monetary
policy rule is an important issue for this new policy regime. John Taylor (2001) argues that “An important
and still unsettled issue for monetary policy in open economies is how much of an interest rate reaction there
should be to the exchange rate in a monetary regime of a ﬂexible exchange rate, an inﬂation target, and a
monetary policy rule.”
In this paper we show that the home bias in consumption can help to replicate two ﬁndings in the data:
1. exchange rates are much more volatile than other macroeconomic variables such as GDP (exchange rate
volatility); 2. the volatility of output does not respond to the volatility of exchange rates (exchange rate
disconnect). Under this explanation of exchange rate volatility and disconnect, our model suggests that the
central bank should not vigorously stabilize the real exchange rate in its monetary policy rule.
There are two diﬀerent strands of literature focusing upon exchange rate stabilization. The ﬁrst one
studies the tradeoﬀ between exchange rate stabilization and the stability of the whole economy. Ball (1999)
and Svensson (2000) ﬁnd that the inclusion of the exchange rate into a monetary policy rule can stabilize
output or inﬂation, or both. In contrast, Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1995) warn policymakers that the required
interest rate changes for exchange rate stabilization can aggravate instability elsewhere in the economy. In
an empirical study on New Zealand, West (2004) ﬁnds that exchange rate stabilization would increase the
volatility of output, inﬂation, and the interest rate. Another strand of literature uses welfare-based New Open
Economy Macroeconomic (NOEM) models to study the tradeoﬀ between real exchange rate stabilization and
the expenditure-switching eﬀect.1 Though elegant in allowing for analytical solutions, these NOEM models
are usually static with no price persistence, and are therefore unable to address the tradeoﬀ considered in
the ﬁrst strand of literature.
Kollmann (2004) incorporates the tradeoﬀs in both strands of literature into a two-country Dynamic
Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model. He compares the welfare eﬀects of the exchange rate policy
in a sticky-price dynamic model. Our paper is closely related. However, our paper emphasizes the connection
between the home bias in consumption and the exchange rate disconnect puzzle. Several authors have recently
used the pricing in importer’s currency (Local Currency Pricing or LCP) to model the low exchange rate
pass-through documented in the data.2 The short-run exchange rate pass-through into import prices is close
1For example, see Devereux and Engel (2003, 2007), Obstfeld (2001, 2002) and the references cited therein. An exception is
Obstfeld (2004). He defends the ﬂexible exchange rate regime in light of its function of allowing the central bank to pursue an
independent interest rate policy in a world of international capital mobility.
2For instance, see Devereux and Engel (2002, 2003), Chari, Kehoe, and McGratten (2002), Duarte and Stockman (2005),
and Kollmann (2004).to zero in those models. Although in industrial countries the pass-through into the consumer price is low,
there is still sizable short-run exchange rate pass-through into the import prices.3 In addition, the LCP in
import prices is also criticized by Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2000b) on the ground that it generates counter-factual
correlation between the exchange rate and the terms of trade. So in this paper, we follow Devereux and
Engel (2007) by assuming that the imports and exports are priced in the producer’s currency (Producer
Currency Pricing or PCP), but ﬁnal goods are priced in the consumer’s currency.
We further assume that both import prices and consumer prices are sticky. When those prices are ﬁxed
in the short run, the import prices in importer’s currency vary with the exchange rate, but the consumer
prices do not change with the exchange rate. In this way, our model allows a low exchange rate pass-through
into the consumer prices and a relatively high pass-through to import prices. Under this setup, we ﬁnd that
the home bias in consumption is critical for our model to replicate the well-documented disconnect between
exchange rates and real macroeconomic variables.4 We follow Devereux and Engel (2002) and Kollmann
(2004) by using the Uncovered Interest-rate Parity (UIP) shock to generate the ﬂuctuations in the nominal
exchange rate. However, Devereux and Engel (2002) use the LCP for import prices to insulate the economy
from exchange rate ﬂuctuations. After we allow the exchange rate movements to pass through into the
import prices, we ﬁnd that only when the foreign market is a small portion of total output, could the UIP
shock in the ﬁnancial market substantially increase the volatility of the exchange rate while keeping the
volatility of real variables, such as GDP, almost unchanged.
The multiple price-stickiness used in this paper also helps us in two additional ways. First, it helps
to replicate that the cyclical behavior of CPI inﬂation generally diﬀers from that of PPI inﬂation in the
data. The latter is typically more volatile and less persistent than the former.5 More importantly, the
multiple price-stickiness incorporates into our model a new tradeoﬀ in the exchange rate policy discussed
by Devereux and Engel (2007): when prices of both imports and ﬁnal consumption goods are sticky, the
ﬂexible exchange rate facilitates the expenditure-switching eﬀect for imports and exports, but distorts the
prices of ﬁnal consumption goods across countries. Based on the fact that the expenditure-switching eﬀect
is empirically weak, they argue, the exchange rate should be stabilized to eliminate the price distortions for
the ﬁnal consumption goods. We can investigate the quantitative importance of this tradeoﬀ in a model
with home bias in consumption.
We limit our search for the optimal exchange rate policy to a class of simple operational policy rules. Our
3For instance, see Campa and Goldberg (2005), Mumtaz, Oomen and Wang (2006).
4For empirical studies on the exchange rate disconnect, see Flood and Rose (1995) and Baxter and Stockman (1989).
5For example, see Clark(1999). This diﬀerence might be caused by the CPI smoothing policy of the central banks rather
than the generic diﬀerence in price-stickiness in these two sectors. However, the same pattern has also been found in the case
of the mid-1930s (see Means (1935)), when the role of monetary policy was not as signiﬁcant as it is today. Dong (2006) also
ﬁnds this diﬀerence in estimating a small-open-economy DSGE model.
2benchmark model suggests a very weak stance against exchange rate ﬂuctuations. Given that the central
bank strongly stabilizes the inﬂation rate, the extra gain from exchange rate stabilization is negligible.
However, if the central bank takes a weak stance against the inﬂation rate, exchange rate stabilization
may induce substantial welfare loss. Intuitively, the real exchange rate volatility in our model is primarily
driven by home bias in consumption and the Uncovered Interest-rate Parity (UIP) shock. The similarity
between home and foreign ﬁnal consumption bundles is low when consumption is biased toward domestic
goods. Therefore, the CPI-based real exchange rate ﬂuctuations do not necessarily imply signiﬁcant price
distortions across countries. In this case, the gain from exchange rate stabilization is small. However, the
restriction on exchange rate ﬂexibility obstructs terms of trade adjustment for intermediate goods. What’s
more, movements of interest rate required for exchange rate stabilization induce prolonged deviations of the
inﬂation rate from its steady-state level, which also lowers welfare. This ﬁnding conﬁrms the conjecture of
Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1995) that exchange rate stabilization will cause economic instability that may be worse
than the exchange rate swings themselves. We also ﬁnd that international monetary cooperation does not
generate signiﬁcant welfare gain compared to Nash equilibrium. This result extends the analysis of Obstfeld
and Rogoﬀ (2002) to a more complicated DSGE model.
As the degree of home bias decreases, we ﬁnd it is more desirable to stabilize the real exchange rate.6
Kollmann (2004) and Leith and Wren-Lewis (2006) ﬁnd similar results. However, we want to be cautious in
interpreting this result as oﬀering support for exchange rate stabilization. In the case with little home bias,
the volatility of the real exchange rate relative to that of GDP is much smaller than what is observed in the
data. In addition, the disconnect between exchange rate and output volatilities exists only when the home
bias is high. Intuitively, when the foreign market is only a very small portion of output (high home bias),
the UIP shock in the ﬁnancial market can drive up exchange rate volatility, but has very limited impact on
output. In this sense, our model provides an interesting solution to the exchange rate disconnect puzzle:
home bias in consumption.7 Our results are consistent with Hau’s (2002) ﬁnding that the volatility of the
real exchange rate is positively correlated with the level of home bias. We conﬁrm this ﬁnding in our data.
In addition, our model also predicts that there is an even stronger relation between the extent of home bias
and the volatility of the real exchange rate relative to the volatility of GDP. We ﬁnd empirical support for
this prediction in our OECD-country data as well.
Our results are robust under the preference with habit persistence, though the welfare cost of exchange
6Devereux and Engel (2007) has no home bias in their model and ﬁnd that the central bank should stabilize the exchange
rate. When home and foreign consumption bundles are identical, the gain from exchange rate stabilization is higher than that
in our benchmark model. Another reason why they get diﬀerent results is because there is no tradeoﬀ between exchange rate
stabilization and inﬂation stabilization in their model. The cost of exchange rate stabilization is lower in their model.
7Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2000a) conjecture that the home bias in consumption caused by trade costs may be important in
explaining the exchange rate disconnect puzzle.
3rate variability is higher under habit persistence.8 When household preferences are more risk sensitive,
welfare loss is higher for given exchange rate variability. However, this does not guarantee that the central
banks should react to exchange rate variation. The cost of real exchange rate stabilization is also higher
under habit persistence. Our model shows that the cost still exceeds the beneﬁt for real exchange rate
stabilization in this case.
In this paper, we take home bias in consumption as exogenously given. Helpman (1999) argues that there
is no clear evidence of home bias in preference after controlling for income. However, our treatment of home
bias can be taken as a shortcut for a model with no home bias in consumption but with high international
trade costs, such as the model in Atkeson and Burstein (2005). Burstein, Neves and Rebelo (2003) ﬁnd a
trade cost that is large enough to generate the same home bias level as in our model, even after controlling for
nominal exchange rate ﬂuctuations. The trade-depressing eﬀect of exchange rate volatility is more plausible
for low-frequency movements of the exchange rate for which hedging strategies are unavailable.9 We doubt
this eﬀect would be strong enough to overturn our results at business cycle frequencies.
We want to emphasize that our paper is not about the optimal choice of exchange rate regimes. We limit
our discussion to a ﬂexible exchange rate regime and study if the central bank should include the exchange
rate in its monetary policy rule. Our model has abstracted away from several beneﬁts of an exchange rate
peg. Governments might decide to adopt a peg because a peg might stimulate international trade, eliminate
competitive devaluations, and impede exchange rate speculation.10 Kollmann (2004) ﬁnds that a monetary
union (an extreme case of a peg) can raise welfare because it eliminates UIP shocks. In this paper, we assume
that the UIP shocks do not respond to monetary policy under a ﬂexible exchange rate regime. We admit
that our results may depend on the interaction between exchange rate stabilization and the volatility of UIP
shocks. Incorporating this interaction requires a model that can endogenously generate the UIP puzzle and
exchange rate volatility. We leave this for our future research.
We also abstract from tradability and trade frictions in our model. Leith and Wren-Lewis (2006) argue
that exchange rate movements may cause large misalignment between tradable and nontradable sectors. They
ﬁnd in a model with both tradable and nontradable sectors that this misalignment provides an additional
incentive for the cental bank to stabilize the exchange rate, though as in our model, they ﬁnd the gain of
exchange rate stabilization is small. Kumhof, Laxton, and Naknoi (2007) show that the exchange rate enters
the optimal policy rule in a model in which ﬁrms enter and exit foreign markets when the exchange rate
ﬂuctuates. Empirical studies on the impacts of business-cycle-frequency ﬂuctuations of the exchange rate on
ﬁrms’ exporting decisions may be fruitful in future research.
8Bergin et al. (2007) ﬁnd similar results.
9Empirical ﬁndings on this eﬀect is mixed. For instance, see Asseery and Peel (1991) and Koray and Lastrapes (1989).
10For instance, see Klein and Shambaugh (2006), Corsetti, et al. (2000), and Pastine (2002).
4Our results are also critically contingent on the mechanism that generates real exchange rate volatility.
There is no consensus among economists on this issue. Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2002) and Devereux
and Engel (2002) attribute exchange rate volatility to nominal stickiness. In contrast, this volatility is mainly
driven by home bias in ﬁnal consumption bundles in Atkeson and Burstein (2005), Ghironi and Melitz (2005),
and our model in this paper. Our results suggest that this debate may have very important implications
for the choice of the exchange rate policy. Further research on whether our results are robust under the
mechanism of sticky-price-driven exchange rate volatility is desirable.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 lays out the theoretical model; Section
3 provides details about calibration and compares the business cycle statistics of our model with those in
the data; Section 4 discusses the solution method and related computational issues; Section 5 presents our
ﬁndings for policy evaluation; and Section 6 concludes and discusses potential future research directions.
2 A Two-country DSGE Model
The world economy consists of two symmetric countries: Home and Foreign. There are two sectors of
production in each country: the ﬁnal good sector and intermediate good sector. Final goods are internation-
ally non-tradeable, and are produced from the internationally traded Home and Foreign intermediate good
composites. The intermediate goods are produced from capital and labor in each country.
In the Home ﬁnal good sector, there is a continuum of diﬀerentiated ﬁnal goods Yt(i) indexed by i ∈ [0,1].
The representative household of Home country uses them to form a ﬁnal good composite Yt according to










In equation (1), θ is the elasticity of substitution between diﬀerentiated ﬁnal goods Yt(i). Each variety of ﬁnal
goods is produced from the Home and Foreign intermediate good composites YHt and YFt by a single ﬁnal
goods ﬁrm. The Home (Foreign) intermediate good composite is composed of diﬀerentiated Home (Foreign)
intermediate goods YHt(j) (YFt(j)).12 In the intermediate good sector, each variety of Home (Foreign)
intermediate goods is produced by a single ﬁrm with capital and labor in the Home (Foreign) country.
11We will give more information about these costs later.
12Note that we use i to index ﬁnal goods while using j for intermediate goods.
52.1 Final Goods Market
The ﬁnal good market is monopolistic competitive. In the Home country, each ﬁnal good ﬁrm produces a

























is the Home (Foreign) intermediate good composite
demanded by ﬁnal good ﬁrm i. α is the weight of the home intermediate good composite required for
producing ﬁnal consumption goods. Consumption is home biased when α > 1
2. γ is the elasticity of
substitution between the home and foreign intermediate good composites. Symmetrically, the production


















The variables with asterisks in equation (3) are foreign counterparts of the variables in Home country. Due
to the symmetry between the two countries, we will focus only on the Home country to describe our model.
In each country, ﬁnal good prices are denominated in the consumer’s currency. In contrast, intermediate
goods are priced in the producer’s currency. For given technology, the ﬁrms chose prices to maximize the
expected proﬁt. We introduce staggered price setting a l´ a Calvo (1983) and Yun (1996). In each period, an
individual ﬁrm has a probability of 1 − λf to re-optimize its price. Otherwise, it will charge a price equal
to last period’s price multiplied by the long-run inﬂation rate (π). When a ﬁnal good ﬁrm re-optimizes its
price, it will choose a price Ptt to maximize the expected life-time real proﬁt.13 So the proﬁt maximization























where Γt,t+k is the pricing kernel between period t and t+k. We assume all ﬁrms are owned by home house-
holds, and therefore Γt,t+k is the marginal rate of substitution between time t and time t + k consumption.



















13For the notation Ptt, the ﬁrst time subscript denotes when the price is re-optimized, and the second time subscript gives
the current time. For example, Ptt+k means the price is re-optimized at time t and is still eﬀective at time t + k. From our
setup, Ptt+k = πkPtt.
6When price is ﬂexible (λf = 0), the optimal price reduces to Ptt = θmct/(θ − 1). The monopolist charges a
constant markup over its marginal cost.
Under this staggered price setting environment, prices are not synchronized across ﬁrms. At any time t,
only a fraction of 1 − λf ﬁrms charge up-to-date optimal price Ptt. A fraction of λk
f(1 − λf) ﬁrms charge











2.2 Intermediate Goods Market
The Home intermediate good composite used by ﬁnal good producers is made from a continuum of diﬀeren-










where φ is the elasticity of substitution between diﬀerentiated intermediate goods. The Foreign intermediate
goods composite is made in the same way from Foreign diﬀerentiated intermediate goods. We suppose that
intermediate goods ﬁrms set prices in the producer’s currency, and the Law of One Price (LOP) holds in
this market. Let PHt(j) be the price of Home intermediate good j in the Home market, and let P∗
Ht(j) be
the price in the Foreign market. By LOP, we have PHt(j) = StP∗
Ht(j).









Ht(j) is the supply of intermediate good j. Kt(j) and Lt(j) are, respectively, capital and labor
used by intermediate good company j. At (A∗
t) is technology shock in the Home (Foreign) country, which is




































where ξ12 = ξ21 are technology spillovers. The vector containing εt and ε∗
t is i.i.d. with zero means and
variance-covariance matrix V .
We follow the same way as in the ﬁnal goods sector to introduce staggered prices. 1−λint is the probability
for ﬁrm j to re-optimize its problem. When re-optimizing price, the intermediate good producer j chooses

























Ht+k = Y d
Ht+k + Y d∗
Ht+k is the world demand for the Home intermediate goods composite.
2.3 Household’s Problem





βtut (Ct,1 − Lt)
#
, (9)
where E0[·] is the conditional expectation operator, and β is the subjective discount factor. The period
utility ut is a concave function of ﬁnal goods composite Ct and leisure 1 − Lt.
The representative household sells labor and rents capital to domestic intermediate good ﬁrms in a
competitive market. The law of motion for capital takes the standard form of
Kt+1 = (1 − δ)Kt + It, (10)
where It is the investment at time t, and δ is the capital depreciation rate. Capital and investment are in
the form of the ﬁnal good composite. There is a real cost for households to adjust capital stock, which is











where Φ is a scale parameter of capital adjustment cost.
The ﬁnancial market is incomplete, in which households can only trade non-state-contingent Home and


















where BHt+1 (BFt+1) is the Home (Foreign) bond held by the household in Home country between period t
and t+1. All bonds are denominated in the issuing country’s currency. φd and φf are parameters of cost for,
respectively, holding domestic bonds and holding foreign bonds.14 We introduce this cost is for a technical
14Note that in Foreign country, φd is the cost of holding Foreign bonds, and φf is the cost of holding Home bonds.
8reason: to ensure that bond holding and consumption are stationary in our model. By assigning very small
values to φd and φf, this cost has a negligible eﬀect on model dynamics.15
Other incomes for households include proﬁts from intermediate and ﬁnal good ﬁrms. The representative
household uses these incomes to buy diﬀerentiated ﬁnal goods and aggregate them into a ﬁnal good composite
(equation (1)). The ﬁnal good composite can be used for consumption, investment or paying the costs of























































For any given initial capital stock and asset position, the representative household chooses the paths of
consumption Ct, labor supply Lt, capital investment It, and bond holdings BHt+1 and BFt+1 to maximize
the expected life time utility subject to the above budget constraint.
In this paper, we employ the period utility function as in equation (12)






The linear form of disutility from labor is used to capture ﬂuctuations in the labor market and can be
justiﬁed by the indivisible labor assumption as in Hansen (1985). The ﬁrst order conditions of the optimal















where Γt,t+1 = β
∂u/∂Ct+1
∂u/∂Ct is the marginal rate of substitution between time t and t + 1 consumption. As it
is well documented that the UIP condition is strongly rejected by data (see Engel (1996) and Lewis (1995)












where ϕt is a UIP shock that can be interpreted as the bias of market expectation on time t + 1 exchange
rate.17 It enters the bond holding condition symmetrically in Foreign country.
15See Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2003) for more details.




Pt from the ﬁrst order conditions since these two terms are small
by assumption.
17Jeanne and Rose (2002) model the market bias with noise traders.
92.4 Monetary Policy Rules and Market Clearing Conditions
In Home country, the monetary authority follows a modiﬁed Taylor rule18










where Ξπ and Ξs are policy parameters determined by the monetary authority. The variables without a
time script are steady-state values. Qt is the real exchange rate deﬁned as StP∗
t /Pt. In this modiﬁed Taylor
rule, the monetary authority adjusts the interest rate to stabilize the inﬂation rate and the real exchange
rate. Unlike the standard Taylor rule, the interest rate here does not react to the output gap. In a closed
economy, Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2004b) ﬁnd that the interest rate should not respond to the output
gap. Since the computation is very intensive in this paper, omitting the output gap from the policy rules
can substantially reduce our computation burden. Foreign monetary authority follows a similar interest rate
rule
i∗














We consider two scenarios in searching for the optimal monetary policy: Nash equilibrium, and interna-
tional monetary cooperation. In the cooperative equilibrium, the policymakers cooperate to choose policy
parameters that maximize the sum of utilities in both countries.
The aggregate demand for the ﬁnal goods composite can be found from resource constraint

























Kt = Yt. (17)
For the bond market clearing condition, we have
BHt + B∗
Ht = 0, (18)
and similar market clearing conditions exist for the Foreign nominal bond and the ﬁnal goods composite.
3 Calibration and Real Business Cycle Statistics
We calibrate our model to match quarterly data. Table 1 shows parameter values used in our calibration.
The annual real interest rate is set to 4%, which gives us a quarterly subjective discount factor of 0.99. The
18We do not include monetary policy shocks in our model. Ireland (2003) ﬁnds that such shocks account for only a very
small amount of variations in real and nominal variables for post-war U.S. data. McCallum (2001) also emphasizes that the
policy coeﬃcients are far more important than monetary policy shocks in shaping the dynamic behavior of key macroeconomic
variables.
10home bias (α) is set to match the fact that the ratio of import to GDP is around 15% in the U.S. θ and
φ are set at levels such that the proﬁt margin is 20% for intermediate and ﬁnal goods ﬁrms. The value for
elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods (γ) is more controversial. Though studies based
on micro-level evidence have suggested an elasticity of around 5,19 Bergin (2004) ﬁnds that the elasticity is
only slightly above 1 in macro-level data. He argues that the substitution rate between home and foreign
goods is lower at the aggregate level. We will follow Bergin’s (2004) result to set γ at 1.1.
For the price-stickiness parameters, we set λf at 0.75. Under this calibration, ﬁnal good ﬁrms re-optimize
prices every four quarters on average. As we have mentioned, the prices of intermediate goods seem less sticky,
so we set λint equal to 0.5. Under this calibration, intermediate good ﬁrms re-optimize every two quarters
on average.20 The production share of capital is set to 0.3, which is in line with the wage consumption
ratio of the U.S. and E.U. countries. Following the estimate of Bergin (2004), we set consumption elasticity
(σ) to unity. As in Kollmann (2004), the preference parameter ρ is equal to one. The capital adjustment
cost is chosen to match the volatility of investment. The cost of holding domestic bonds is equal to zero,
and of holding foreign bonds is equal to 0.0037 divided by steady-state export. As we have mentioned, we
introduce these costs to guarantee the stationarity of our model. They have no eﬀect on our major results.
The annual capital depreciation rate is 10%, which gives us the quarterly depreciation rate of δ = 0.025.
Steady-state quarterly inﬂation is set at 1.0103 in both countries, which implies an annual inﬂation rate of
4.2%. For the technology shocks, we follow the standard setup in the literature and set the AR(1) coeﬃcients
at ξ11 = ξ22 = 0.9, and the technology spillovers at ξ12=ξ21=0.03. The standard deviation of technology
disturbance is set to 0.0085 by following Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland (1992). For simplicity, we suppose
that the disturbances are uncorrelated across countries.
We follow Kollmann’s (2004) two-factor structure to calibrate the uncovered interest rate parity (UIP)
shock
log(ϕt) = at + µt
at = λaat−1 + ηat. (19)
The parameter λa equals 0.88. The standard deviations of white noises are ση = 0.0109 and σµ = 0.022.
Table (2) reports business cycle statistics of our model. The table shows the results for our benchmark
model (Benchmark), the benchmark model without UIP shock (No UIP) and the model with habit persistence
preference (Habit). Under the above calibration, our model can successfully duplicate some major business
19For instance, see Harrigan (1993).
20This price adjustment frequency is supported by Mumtaz, Oomen and Wang (2006). In that paper, we ﬁnd the exchange
rate changes are generally passed to import prices within two quarters.
11cycle properties found in the data. The standard deviation of GDP is of the same order as that in the
data. Consumption is less volatile than GDP, and investment is about three times as volatile as GDP. An
important diﬀerence between our benchmark model and the model without the UIP shock is the volatility
of the real exchange rate. With the UIP shock, we can duplicate the fact that the real exchange rate is
about four times as volatile as GDP. The duplication of this property is very important for the analysis of
exchange rate policy.
4 Solution Method and Policy Evaluation
It is well known that the standard ﬁrst-order approximation method can generate spurious welfare rankings
when long-run distortions exist in the model.21 Therefore, we employ a second-order accurate solution
method developed by Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2004a).22 Following Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2004b), we
assume that in the initial state, all state variables are in their non-stochastic steady states, and the monetary
policies are evaluated by the conditional expectations of the discounted lifetime utility.
The welfare loss (τ) of a particular monetary policy relative to the optimal one is measured as percentage
consumption obtained under the optimal monetary policy that the household is willing to give up to achieve
the same welfare level obtained in an alternative monetary policy. Let V
opt
t be the welfare obtained under
optimal monetary policy, and let {Copt
s ,Lopt
s }∞


















Substituting the period utility function into the above equation, we can ﬁnd the formula for calculating τ










In searching for the optimal monetary policy, we limit our attention to the simple operational rules, as
deﬁned in Section (2.4). We require that the operational rules induce a locally unique equilibrium, and that
the nominal interest rate be non-negative. For technical reasons, we are unable to impose the non-negativity
21For instance, see Kim and Kim (2003).
22Other works of second-order accurate solution method include Kim, Kim, Schaumburg and Sims (2003)
12constraint into our model directly.23 We follow Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2004b) to require that the target
value of nominal interest rate be at least twice as large as the standard deviation of the nominal interest
rate. This constraint guarantees a positive interest rate 98% of time if the equilibrium nominal interest rate
is normally distributed.
A policy rule is optimal if it satisﬁes the above requirements and also yields the highest level of welfare.
We use the method of grid search to ﬁnd out this optimal rule. The welfare surface obtained from grid search
shows us how much the welfare level changes in cases of policy mistakes. We would prefer to have a policy
regime in which welfare is less sensitive to policy errors. We also limit our grid search to a reasonable range
for each policy parameter. The optimal value for the inﬂation stabilization parameter Ξπ has usually been
found to be around 1.5 in other studies. We search over a slightly broader interval of [0,3] for this parameter.
The reaction of interest rate to exchange rate is relatively smaller, so we set the interval as [0,0.1].
4.1 CPI Inﬂation Targeting
We ﬁrst consider the simplest rule where the interest rate reacts only to CPI inﬂation. There are two distinct
price indices in our model: CPI and PPI. In a quick comparison between CPI and other inﬂation targeting
regimes, we do not ﬁnd obvious advantages of other regimes.24 Furthermore, only CPI inﬂation is formally
targeted by the central banks in practice, though both indices are available. Figure 1 shows conditional
welfare as a function of policy parameter Ξπ. The welfare is obtained through a grid search over [0,3] for
Ξπ in steps of 0.1.25 The plot begins from Ξπ = 1.1 because the equilibrium is indeterminate when Ξπ is
less than or equal to unity.26
Figure 1 suggests a strong stance on inﬂation for the central banks: in optimal monetary policy, Ξπ
should be set to its highest possible level of 3. However, the curvature of welfare is very ﬂat after the point
of Ξπ = 1.5. Therefore, the marginal gain from stabilizing the inﬂation rate is very small after this point.
Empirical studies show that, Ξπ = 1.5 has been a realistic policy benchmark for industrial countries over
the past two decades.
As we have mentioned, we follow Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2004b) in requiring that the steady-state
interest rate be at least twice as large as the standard deviation of the nominal interest rate. Table 3 shows
the standard deviation of the nominal interest rate and the ratio of the steady-state interest rate to this
variable under diﬀerent policy parameters. All parameter values satisfy our non-negativity condition with
23See Rotemberg and Woodford (1999, p.75) and Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2004b) for more discussion.
24Results are available upon request. Huang and Liu (2005) ﬁnd that it is optimal to target both CPI and PPI inﬂations if
ﬁnal and intermediate good sectors are subject to diﬀerent shocks.
25We assume a symmetric foreign policy (Ξ∗
π = Ξπ) for a reason we will explain shortly.
26This is consistent with the Taylor principle, in which the central bank should raise the interest rate instrument more than
one-for-one with increases in inﬂation. Such an interest rate feedback rule can be compatible with a determinate equilibrium
price level. See Taylor (1999) for more discussion of the desirability of this principle.
13a ratio bigger than two. Note that the standard deviation of the interest rate actually decreases with the
central bank’s stance on inﬂation rate. When the monetary authority is more aggressive against the inﬂation
rate, the interest rate has less opportunity to hit the zero bound. For given inﬂation volatility, it should be
easier to hit the zero bound if the central bank adjust the interest rate more aggressively to ﬁght against
the inﬂation rate. However, in a rational expectation model, the volatility of the inﬂation rate decreases
with the central bank’s stance against the inﬂation ﬂuctuations. Our result suggests that the decrease of
inﬂation rate volatility is the dominant eﬀect in our model. We will follow the same method in checking the
non-negativity condition in the following policy analysis.
4.2 Exchange Rate Stabilization
In this section we study whether the interest rate should directly react to real exchange rate ﬂuctuations
in the Nash equilibrium. The interest rate rules are deﬁned in equations (15) and (16). We ﬁnd Nash
equilibrium by searching over [0, 0.1] in steps of 0.01 for Ξs and Ξ∗
s, and over [0, 3] in steps of 0.1 for Ξπ and
Ξ∗
π. In Nash equilibrium, the optimal monetary policy is symmetric with Ξs = Ξ∗
s = 0.01 and Ξπ = Ξ∗
π = 3.
This result suggests a very loose stance against exchange rate stabilization: an increase of 40 basis points
for the annual interest rate in the face of 10 percent real depreciation. The welfare gain from the exchange
rate stabilization is also negligible. In Table 4, we compare the Nash equilibrium with other symmetric
policies. In comparison with the case of no exchange rate stabilization (Ξπ = Ξ∗
π = 3 and Ξs = Ξ∗
s = 0), the
welfare gain is only 0.0007% of consumption. This is negligible relative to the welfare gain from the inﬂation
stabilization, which is 0.7383% of consumption. Furthermore, when the central bank takes a looser stance on
inﬂation, our results suggest that mistakenly targeting the exchange rate may, in fact, be very destructive.
For example, when Ξπ = 1.1, the welfare loss is more than one percent of consumption if the central banks
set Ξs at 0.08 or higher.
To understand our results, we ﬁrst consider the behavior of the real exchange rate when all prices are
ﬂexible. When both λf and λint are equal to zero, all ﬁrms change prices every period, and our model
reduces to the one with ﬂexible prices. From the calculation of standard deviations and the impulse response
functions, we ﬁnd the real exchange rate is not constant, even when the prices are fully ﬂexible. The standard
deviation of the real exchange rate in the ﬂexible price model is about 85% as volatile as that in the sticky
price model.27 This result questions exchange rate stabilization as a legitimate goal of monetary policy:
exchange rate stabilization does not help replicate ﬂexible price allocations if the ﬂexible-price exchange rate
itself is not constant.
27The standard deviation of the (log) real exchange rate is 5.10% and 5.94% for the ﬂexible- and sticky-price models,
respectively.

















Ft)1−γ + (1 − α)(P∗
Ht)1−γ 1
1−γ . (24)
Though we have assumed the Law of One Price for the intermediate goods market with PHt = P∗
HtSt and
PFt = P∗
FtSt, Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) is not generally satisﬁed except when α = 1
2.28 Intuitively,
when there is home bias in the ﬁnal good sector, the ﬁnal consumption goods are not identical across
countries. Even if all prices are ﬂexible, we cannot expect the ﬁnal good composite to have the same value
when denominated in the same currency. In this case, CPI-based real exchange rate ﬂuctuations do not
necessarily suggest signiﬁcant price distortions for ﬁnal consumption goods across borders. Therefore, there
is not much welfare gain from exchange rate stabilization.
In contrast, the restrictions on exchange rate movements obstruct the expenditure-switching eﬀect for
intermediate goods: in the face of country-speciﬁc technology shocks, the nominal exchange rate cannot
move freely to adjust the terms of trade. It can be seen more clearly in Figure 2 that the impulse response
function of the terms of trade is closer to that of the ﬂexible price terms of trade when there is no exchange
rate stabilization. The exchange rate stabilization also increases inﬂation volatility in our benchmark model,
which reduces the welfare level under staggered price setting. Figure 3(a) shows the impulse response
functions to a one-percent technology shock in the home country. We denote by circles (asterisks) the policy
with (without) exchange rate stabilization. Although the real exchange rate is more stable when the interest
rate directly reacts to exchange rate ﬂuctuations, the inﬂation rates are more volatile. Figure 3(b) shows
the impulse response functions to the UIP shock. The Home currency depreciates in the face of the shock,
which induces the increase of CPI inﬂation. Therefore, the central bank should increase the interest rate in
response. If the central bank also stabilizes the real exchange rate, the depreciation of the home currency also
calls for an increase of the interest rate, which will reinforce inﬂation stabilization. As a result, CPI inﬂation
is more stable on the impact of the shock. However, the CPI inﬂation converges back to its steady-state
more slowly in this case. Meanwhile, the increase in the interest rate suppresses market demand so much
that the prices of intermediate goods even decrease and become more volatile. The increase of inﬂation rate
volatility induces higher price dispersions among ﬁrms and hence lowers the welfare level.
The welfare loss from exchange rate stabilization is sensitive to the central bank’s stance on the inﬂation
rate. Intuitively, when the central bank takes a strong stance against the inﬂation rate, the inﬂation insta-
28Another case in which the condition of PPP holds is PHt = PFt. That is, the terms of trade is equal to unity all the time.
This condition is obviously not true when there is a country-speciﬁc productivity shock and prices are ﬂexible.
15bility caused by exchange rate stabilization will be oﬀset by the inﬂation stabilization term Ξπ in the policy
rule. However, with the decrease of Ξπ, exchange rate stabilization becomes more harmful. Our results
suggest no exchange rate stabilization in this case.
We also consider the case in which the policymakers cooperate to maximize the sum of utilities in both
countries. We assume the central planner gives equal weights to the Home and Foreign countries. The
optimal monetary policy coincides with that in the Nash equilibrium. This is consistent with Obstfeld and
Rogoﬀ’s (2002) ﬁnding that the lack of international coordination in setting monetary policy rules may not
be an important issue. In this paper, we extend their results to a DSGE model.
As we have mentioned, the gain from exchange rate stabilization is small when the similarity of ﬁnal
consumption bundles is low. Intuitively, exchange rate stabilization should become more desirable when
home bias declines. Table 5 shows the results when the home bias parameter α is set to the lower level of
0.6. Our results suggest a much stronger stance against exchange rate ﬂuctuations: the annual interest rate
should increase 5.6 percentage points in face of 10% real depreciation. When the home bias decreases, there
are two eﬀects on the real exchange rate stabilization. The ﬁnal consumption bundles become more similar,
so we can gain more from real exchange rate stabilization. In addition, our model predicts a more stable
real exchange rate for given exogenous shocks in the case of less home bias. Therefore, the central banks do
not have to adjust the interest rate as much as before to stabilize the real exchange rate, which reduces the
cost of real exchange rate stabilization.
However, we should be cautious in interpreting this result as a support for exchange rate stabilization.
We have noticed that in the above case with low home bias, the volatility of the real exchange rate relative
to the volatility of GDP is too small to match the data. Unlike in Devereux and Engel (2002), we cannot
increase the relative volatility simply by increasing the UIP shock. When we increase the UIP shock, both
real exchange rate and GDP become more volatile. As a result, the relative volatility of the real exchange
rate to that of GDP becomes pretty stable at around 1.4 (see Panel A of Table 6), even with big increases in
the UIP shock. Intuitively, we have assumed LOP for the intermediate goods market. So any exchange rate
shock will pass through to the prices of exports immediately. If the foreign market makes up a big portion
of the total output, as in the case with little home bias, increasing the UIP shock drives up the volatility of
GDP when we use it to pump up the volatility of the real exchange rate. This result is contradictory to the
well-documented exchange rate disconnect puzzle.
We also notice that the welfare gain of directly reacting to the exchange rate is very small in both cases.
As we have mentioned, it is not surprising to ﬁnd negligible gains in our benchmark model, since the real
exchange rate ﬂuctuations do not imply signiﬁcant price distortions across borders. In the case with less
home bias, the welfare gain is higher but is still at only about 0.01% of consumption. There are two possible
16reasons for this case. The exchange rate stabilization helps eliminate price distortions across countries, and
therefore facilitates international risk-sharing. But the gain from international risk-sharing is generally small,
especially in a production economy with capital accumulation like ours. For example, Kim and Kim (2003)
ﬁnd the gain is between 0.005% and 0.02%.29 However, this result may also be caused by the unrealistically
small real exchange rate volatility in the case with less home bias.
4.3 Home Bias and Exchange Rate Disconnect
In this section, we provide empirical supports for our model predictions.
4.3.1 Model Prediction
We have shown in Table 2 that our benchmark model can successfully duplicate exchange rate volatility.
Our model also exhibits exchange rate disconnect when the home bias is high. In Panel B of Table 6, we
show how the standard deviations of the real exchange rate and GDP change with UIP shock. With the
increase of the UIP shock, the standard deviation of the real exchange rate becomes about 10 times larger
than before, while the standard deviation of GDP increases only by about 30 percent. This property is
consistent with the empirical ﬁnding of Baxter and Stockman (1989) that the behavior of macroeconomic
aggregates did not signiﬁcantly change when the exchange rates became much more volatile.
Panel C of Table 6 shows that the volatility of the real exchange rate relative to the volatility of GDP
increases with the extent of home bias in our model. For a given monetary policy (left panel of Panel C),
a higher home bias has two eﬀects on the relative volatility: the real exchange rate is more volatile, since
the ﬁnal consumption goods are more diﬀerent across countries; at the same time, GDP is less volatile, in
that the exchange rate shock has impacts on a smaller portion of the total output. As a result, the relative
volatility increases with home bias at a faster rate than does the standard deviation of the real exchange rate
as shown in Panel C. If monetary policy is re-optimized under each home bias level (right panel of Panel C),
the positive relation between the extent of home bias and the volatility of the real exchange rate (relative to
the volatility of GDP) is strengthened, because more open (less home biased) countries put more weight on
exchange rate stabilization in our model.30
Hau (2002) ﬁnds in the data that real exchange rate volatility is negatively correlated with the openness
of a country (or positively correlated with home bias). In our model, we predict that a stronger relation
exists between the openness and the ratio of real exchange rate volatility to GDP volatility. It is of interest
to ﬁnd out if our prediction is consistent with the data.
29Tesar (1995) reports similar results.
30I thank an anonymous referee for suggesting I explore this issue.
174.3.2 Empirical Support
We use the following data of OECD countries from International Financial Statistics (IFS): (1) real eﬀective
exchange rates, (2) imports and exports of goods and services and (3) GDP per capita.31 Following Hau
(2002), we use data for the period between 1980 and 1998, but we choose to use quarterly data, hoping to
ﬁnd a strong relation between relative real exchange rate volatility and openness, even with relatively high
frequency data.
We follow the same method as Hau (2002) in calculating the openness and the volatility of the real
exchange rate. The openness at period t is measured by the ratio of average imports and exports to GDP.
The openness of country i is the average openness during our sampling period.32 The volatility of the real














where s is the real eﬀective exchange rate of country i. To obtain the volatility of GDP per capita, we
ﬁrst detrend the logarithm of GDP per capita with the HP ﬁlter and then calculate the standard deviation
of the detrended data for each country. Our sample includes 22 countries that are members of the OECD
during the sample period.33 Figure 4 shows the scatter diagrams of Real Eﬀective Exchange Rate (REER)
volatility and REER volatility relative to GDP volatility against openness. Both variables display some
negative correlation with the openness. However, the relation between the relative volatility of REER and
openness seems stronger.34
Table 7 reports our OLS regression results. In Panel A, we regress the volatility of the real exchange
rate and relative volatility against openness. The coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant at least at a 10% level in
both regressions. As we have mentioned, the negative correlation between real exchange rate volatility and
openness may simply reﬂect the endogeneity of the exchange rate regime: more open economies are more
likely to stabilize their exchange rates. In an exercise that is not reported in this paper, we include Reinhart
and Rogoﬀ’s (2002) classiﬁcation of exchange rate regimes in our regressions. We do ﬁnd that the exchange
rate policy has signiﬁcant eﬀects on exchange rate volatility. However, openness remains signiﬁcant in our
regressions.35 In Panel B, we take logarithms for both dependent and independent variables. In this case, β
31GDP per capita is calculated as GDP divided by the total population in each country.
32There is no obvious trend for openness in most countries, and our results do not change after we take out the countries in
which openness seems to have a signiﬁcant trend during our sampling period. These countries include Canada, Ireland, Japan
and Spain.
33We exclude Greece and Luxembourg due to the unavailability of data.
34Belgium and Ireland seem to be two outliers in ﬁgure (4). Our results reported below are robust even after we remove these
two countries from our sample.
35Results are available upon request.
18is the elasticity of yi against openness. Let β1 be the elasticity of REER volatility over openness, and let β2
be the elasticity of the relative volatility. We ﬁnd the volatility of the real exchange rate relative to that of
GDP responds more to the openness than the volatility of the real exchange rate does (β2 < β1),36 which is
consistent with our prediction.
Our results are also robust for a larger sample size. We include the same countries as Hau (2002) in our
sample with 46 countries.37 Since for most countries, GDP data are available only at annual frequency, we
expand our sample period to include data between 1975 and 1998 in order to have more observations for
each country. The results of the sample with 46 countries are also reported in Table 7. The ﬁndings are very
similar to those from the OECD data.38
4.4 Robustness Analysis
In this section, we test whether our results are robust under diﬀerent model setups.
4.4.1 Habit Persistence
Bergin et al. (2007) ﬁnd that habit persistence has important impacts on welfare loss caused by exchange
rate variations. They report a welfare loss of 4.554% consumption in the case of habit persistence in contrast
to 0.144% otherwise. Will this higher welfare loss provide grounds for exchange rate stabilization?
We modify our utility function in equation (12) to accommodate habit persistence





In this new period utility function, the households try to smooth a weighted average of current consumption
and the change of consumption. ζ is the weight put on the change of consumption. Under this preference,
households are more sensitive to exogenous risks. This form of the utility function has been widely used in
literature explaining the equity premium puzzle.
We calibrate ζ as 0.8, which is found to be a reasonable value by Deaton (1987) and Constantinides
(1990) to explain aggregate consumption smoothness and the equity premium puzzle. The real business cycle
statistics are reported in Table 2. Table 8 shows welfare level and loss under habit persistence preference.
We ﬁnd this change does not aﬀect our results: the interest rate should not directly react to the exchange
rate. Households are more risk averse with habit persistence, so welfare loss is higher for given exchange
36The null hypothesis that β2 − β1 ≥ 0 is rejected at 10% level.
37Ecuador is excluded due to the unavailability of data.
38We marginally missed the 10% signiﬁcant level for the null hypothesis that β2 − β1 ≥ 0 in this sample, but the point
estimates are still consistent with our model prediction. We assumed a constant exchange rate shock across countries in our
model prediction. This assumption is more likely to be violated when we include developing countries into our sample.
19rate variation. However, the cost of exchange rate stabilization is also higher: the welfare loss from inﬂation
instability is also higher under habit persistence. Our results show the latter still wins out in the competition.
4.4.2 Exchange Rate Disconnect and Monetary Policy
In this section, we check the extent to which our explanation of the exchange rate disconnect puzzle depends
on the format of interest rate rules. We are particularly interested in whether the inclusion of exchange rate
stabilization in the policy rule will change our results.
Table 9 reports how the volatility of the real exchange rate and GDP changes with the UIP shock if the
central banks set the exchange rate policy parameter Ξs at 0.1, 0.2, and 0.5. When Ξs equals 0.1 or less, the
exchange rate disconnect still exists in our model. With the increase of UIP shock, the standard deviation
of GDP increases less than 15%, while the real exchange rate is over 7 times more volatile than before.
However, when the central bank puts more weight on exchange rate stabilization, the UIP shock exerts
greater impact on the standard deviation of GDP. Intuitively, with a stronger stance against exchange rate
ﬂuctuations, the central bank moves the interest rate more to ﬁght against exchange rate shock. Therefore,
the ﬁnancial market shock becomes more inﬂuential for real variables. With the increase of Ξs, we ﬁnd in
Panel A that the GDP becomes more volatile, while the real exchange rate becomes less volatile.39 As a
result, at the volatility of GDP observed in the data, the volatility of the real exchange rate relative to that
of GDP is much smaller than what we have seen in the data. For example, when Ξs is equal to 0.5, the ratio
of exchange rate volatility to GDP volatility is only 0.73 if the standard deviation of GDP is equal to 1.73%.
In Panel B of Table 9, we ﬁnd that the relation between home bias and the volatility of the exchange rate
relative to the volatility of GDP is weaker when the central banks stabilize the exchange rate. In particular,
the relative volatility decreases with home bias when α is greater than 0.8, and Ξs is equal to or greater
than 0.2. However, if the central bank choose Ξs optimally for each home bias level, there exists a strong
negative relation between the relative volatility and home bias.
To sum up, our explanation of exchange rate volatility and the exchange rate disconnect puzzle is sensitive
to the assumption about monetary policy. However, in empirical studies, the estimate of Ξs is usually well
below 0.1. For example, see Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1998) and Bergin (2004).40 Judging from empirical
relevance, our explanation is still valid under exchange rate stabilization.
39We ﬁnd the standard deviation of GDP decreases with Ξs in the ﬁrst column of data. Intuitively, there is no ﬁnancial
market shock in this column. The real exchange rate volatility is caused by a technology shock. In this case, the exchange rate
and GDP stabilizations are consistent.
40In Clarida et al. (1998), the estimate of the exchange rate stabilization parameter for the annualized interest rate is 0.05.
Therefore, the relevant one for our quarterly interest rate is 0.05 ÷ 4 = 0.0125. Similarly, the relevant estimate from Bergin
(2004) is 0.1128 ÷ 4 ≈ 0.03.
205 Conclusion
In this paper, we examine how much the interest rate should react to real exchange rate ﬂuctuations in a
two-country DSGE model. In our model the exchange rate volatility is mainly driven by the home bias
in consumption and the UIP shock to the exchange rate. Our results suggest a very loose stance against
exchange rate stabilization. In particular, when the central bank does not take a strong stance against the
inﬂation rate, the inclusion of the exchange rate into the monetary policy rule may induce signiﬁcant welfare
loss. We also ﬁnd that there is no welfare gain from the international monetary cooperation, which extends
Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ’s (2002) ﬁndings to a DSGE model. We show that to match some other important
empirical regularities, the home bias in consumption is crucial for a model to duplicate the exchange rate
volatility and the exchange rate disconnect. We ﬁnd support in the data for our explanation of the exchange
rate disconnect puzzle.
Our policy evaluations are admittedly contingent on the assumption that real exchange rate volatility is
mainly driven by home bias and the exchange rate shock. Though the home bias in consumption can be
justiﬁed by a more carefully structured model with high international trade costs, we could explore in more
details the microstructure of the UIP shock, and how this shock interacts with the exchange rate policy.
Since our results also show the extent of home bias has important implications for exchange rate policy, it is
also desirable for future research to test whether optimal exchange rate policy varies with assumptions that
drive exchange rate volatility in the model.
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26Table 1: Calibration
Parameter Value Description
β 0.99 Subjective discount factor
α 0.85 Home bias
θ 6 Elasticity of substitution between ﬁnal goods
φ 6 Elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods
γ 1.1 Elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods
λf 0.75 Probability of not re-optimizing for ﬁnal goods ﬁrm
λint 0.5 Probability of not re-optimizing for intermediate goods ﬁrm
ψ 0.3 Share of capital in production
σ 1 Preference parameter
ρ 1 Preference parameter
Φ 8 Cost parameter of capital adjustment
φd 0 Cost parameter of holding domestic bonds
φf 0.0037/Y ∗
H Cost parameter of holding foreign bonds
δ 0.025 Capital depreciation rate
π 1.0103 Steady-state inﬂation rate in Home country
π∗ 1.0103 Steady-state inﬂation rate in Foreign country
A 1 Steady-state technology shock in Home country
A∗ 1 Steady-state technology shock in Foreign country
ξ11 = ξ22 0.9 Technology shock AR(1) coeﬃcient
ξ12 = ξ21 0.03 Technology spillovers
λa 0.88 UIP shock parameter
ζ 0.8 Habit persistence parameter
Table 2: Business Cycle Statistics
Standard Deviations Relative to That of GDP
SD of GDP (%) Consumption Investment Employment RE
US Data 1.82 0.83 2.78 0.67 4.36
Benchmark 1.54 0.88 2.83 0.95 3.86
No UIP 1.59 0.62 2.72 0.26 0.61
Habit 1.59 0.46 2.72 1.18 3.45
Autocorrelation
GDP Consumption Investment Employment RE
US Data 0.88 0.89 0.91 0.90 0.83
Benchmark 0.63 0.66 0.65 0.58 0.63
No UIP 0.68 0.68 0.67 0.66 0.68
Habit 0.70 0.91 0.65 0.63 0.66
Note:
–Statistics of the US data are from Chari et al. (2002).
–Model statistics are the average of 100 simulations. All artiﬁcial data from simulations are logged
and H-P ﬁltered with a smoothing parameter of 1600.
–The standard deviation of productivity shocks in Benchmark is 0.0085 by following Backus,
Kehoe, and Kydland (1992). It is set to 0.011 in models of “No UIP” and “Habit” such that
GDP in all three models has approximately the same volatility. Capital adjustment cost is
calibrated to match the volatility of investment. All other parameters are the same for all three
models.
27Table 3: Non-negativity Check of Nominal Interest Rate
Ξπ 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.9 2.0
SD (%) 0.958 0.848 0.765 0.705 0.660 0.626 0.600 0.578 0.561 0.546
Ratio† 2.119 2.394 2.653 2.879 3.074 3.241 3.386 3.511 3.620 3.715
Ξπ 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.9 3.0
SD (%) 0.534 0.524 0.516 0.508 0.502 0.496 0.491 0.487 0.484 0.480
Ratio† 3.799 3.872 3.937 3.994 4.045 4.090 4.130 4.166 4.198 4.227
Note:
†–Ratio of steady-state interest rate to standard deviation of the interest rate.
Table 4: Exchange Rate Stabilization in Benchmark Model
Ξπ = 3.0 Ξπ = 1.1
Ξs Welfare Level Welfare Loss (%)† Welfare Level Welfare Loss (%)†
0.00 -53.8608 0.0007 -54.5964 0.0000
0.01 -53.8601 0.0000 -54.6144 0.0180
0.02 -53.8609 0.0008 -54.7097 0.1132
0.03 -53.8632 0.0031 -54.8449 0.2481
0.04 -53.8667 0.0067 -54.9985 0.4013
0.05 -53.8715 0.0114 -55.1587 0.5607
0.06 -53.8773 0.0172 -55.3186 0.7196
0.07 -53.8841 0.0240 -55.4745 0.8742
0.08 -53.8918 0.0317 -55.6244 1.0227
0.09 -53.9004 0.0403 -55.7674 1.1642
0.10 -53.9097 0.0496 -55.9031 1.2982
Note:
†–Welfare loss is measured by the percentage consumption loss.










. The optimal monetary
policy is displayed in bold.
Table 5: Exchange Rate Stabilization in Model with Less Home Bias (α = 0.6)
Ξπ = 3.0 Ξπ = 1.1
Ξs Welfare Level Welfare Loss (%)† Ξs Welfare Level Welfare Loss (%)†
0.00 -53.9726 0.0115 0.00 -54.5214 0.0000
0.02 -53.9689 0.0078 0.01 -54.5502 0.0288
0.04 -53.9660 0.0050 0.02 -54.5856 0.0641
0.06 -53.9639 0.0029 0.03 -54.6294 0.1079
0.08 -53.9625 0.0014 0.04 -54.6840 0.1624
0.10 -53.9616 0.0005 0.05 -54.7526 0.2309
0.12 -53.9611 0.0001 0.06 -54.8400 0.3180
0.14 -53.9611 0.0000 0.07 -54.9526 0.4303
0.16 -53.9614 0.0003 0.08 -55.1003 0.5772
0.18 -53.9620 0.0009 0.09 -55.2979 0.7734
0.20 -53.9629 0.0018 0.10 -55.3690 0.8440
Note:
†–Welfare loss is measured by the percentage consumption loss.










. The optimal monetary policy is
displayed in bold.
28Table 6: Exchange Rate Disconnect
Panel A: No exchange rate disconnect if home bias is low (α = 0.6).
UIP Shock (σµ, %) 0.00 0.30 0.60 0.90 1.20 1.50 1.80 2.10 2.40
UIP Shock (ση, %) 0.00 0.15 0.30 0.45 0.60 0.75 0.90 1.05 1.20
SD of GDP (%) 1.12 1.20 1.29 1.44 1.62 1.85 2.13 2.38 2.61
SD of RER (%) 0.21 0.54 1.02 1.52 1.97 2.46 2.97 3.46 3.95
SD of RER
SD of GDP 0.19 0.45 0.80 1.06 1.22 1.33 1.39 1.46 1.51
Panel B: Exchange Rate Disconnect in Benchmark (α = 0.85)
UIP Shock (σµ, %) 0.00 0.30 0.60 0.90 1.20 1.50 1.80 2.10 2.40
UIP Shock (ση, %) 0.00 0.15 0.30 0.45 0.60 0.75 0.90 1.05 1.20
SD of GDP (%) 1.19 1.18 1.23 1.27 1.29 1.37 1.45 1.52 1.60
SD of RER (%) 0.76 1.09 1.78 2.60 3.42 4.11 4.90 5.76 6.52
SD of RER
SD of GDP 0.64 0.92 1.44 2.05 2.66 3.00 3.38 3.78 4.08
Panel C: Relative Volatility Changes with Home Bias
Constant Monetary Policy Optimal Monetary Policy
Home Bias (α) 0.50 0.60 0.70 0.80 0.90 0.50 0.60 0.70 0.80 0.90
SD of RER (%) 1.94 2.41 3.29 4.59 6.23 0.47 1.94 3.11 4.43 6.12
SD of RER
SD of GDP 0.73 1.09 1.81 2.95 4.43 0.20 0.95 1.74 2.90 4.50
Note:
–Model statistics are the average of 100 simulations. All artiﬁcial data from simulations are logged and
H-P ﬁltered with a smoothing parameter of 1600.
–Home bias parameter (α) is set to 0.6 in Panel A and it is 0.85 in Panel B (Benchmark).
–In Panels A and B, all other parameters are ﬁxed to their benchmark values while the volatility of UIP






–Panel C: All other parameters are ﬁxed to their benchmark values while home bias varies. Under
















) is re-optimized for each home bias level under Optimal Monetary
Policy.
Table 7: OLS Regression Results
Panel A: yi = α + βopennessi + εi
yi = REER vol yi = REER vol
GDP vol
OECD 46 Countries OECD 46 Countries
-0.037 -0.054 -2.550 -0.754
β (0.019)∗ (0.030)∗ (0.928)∗∗ (0.327)∗∗
R-squared 0.163 0.068 0.274 0.108
# of obs. 22 46 22 46
Panel B: Log(yi) = α + βLog(opennessi) + εi
yi = REER vol yi = REER vol
GDP vol
OECD 46 Countries OECD 46 Countries
-0.481 -0.311 -0.754 -0.525
β (0.182)∗∗ (0.159)∗ (0.233)∗∗∗ (0.185)∗∗∗
R-squared 0.258 0.080 0.344 0.154
# of obs. 22 46 22 46
Note :
–Standard deviations are reported in parentheses.
∗ − 10% signiﬁcant ∗ ∗ −5% signiﬁcant ∗ ∗ ∗ − 1% signiﬁcant
29Table 8: Exchange Rate Stabilization with Habit Persistence)
Ξπ = 3.0 Ξπ = 1.1
Ξs Welfare Level Welfare Loss (%)† Welfare Level Welfare Loss (%)†
0.00 -287.5157 0.0000 -288.2299 0.0000
0.01 -287.5190 0.0033 -288.2644 0.0345
0.02 -287.5239 0.0082 -288.3717 0.1417
0.03 -287.5304 0.0147 -288.5160 0.2857
0.04 -287.5382 0.0225 -288.6769 0.4460
0.05 -287.5473 0.0316 -288.8429 0.6112
0.06 -287.5575 0.0418 -289.0078 0.7749
0.07 -287.5688 0.0531 -289.1679 0.9336
0.08 -287.5810 0.0653 -289.3215 1.0857
0.09 -287.5941 0.0784 -289.4678 1.2302
0.10 -287.6080 0.0922 -289.6064 1.3671
Note :
†–Welfare loss is measured by the percentage consumption loss.










. The optimal monetary
policy is displayed in bold.
Table 9: GDP and Exchange Rate Volatility under Exchange Rate Targeting
Panel A: Standard Deviation Changes with UIP Shock
UIP Shock (σµ, %) 0.00 0.30 0.60 0.90 1.20 1.50 1.80 2.10 2.40
UIP Shock (ση, %) 0.00 0.15 0.30 0.45 0.60 0.75 0.90 1.05 1.20
SD of GDP (%)
Ξs=0.1 1.09 1.13 1.10 1.08 1.13 1.15 1.14 1.17 1.15
Ξs=0.2 1.08 1.09 1.08 1.10 1.19 1.19 1.29 1.33 1.38
Ξs=0.5 1.02 1.06 1.09 1.19 1.31 1.44 1.55 1.73 1.87
SD of RER (%)
Ξs=0.1 0.51 0.69 1.06 1.49 1.93 2.39 2.79 3.32 3.74
Ξs=0.2 0.38 0.50 0.77 1.07 1.38 1.68 2.03 2.40 2.70
Ξs=0.5 0.21 0.27 0.41 0.57 0.73 0.89 1.07 1.25 1.39
SD of RER
SD of GDP
Ξs=0.1 0.46 0.61 0.96 1.37 1.71 2.08 2.43 2.83 3.25
Ξs=0.2 0.36 0.46 0.71 0.97 1.16 1.41 1.57 1.80 1.95
Ξs=0.5 0.21 0.26 0.37 0.48 0.56 0.62 0.69 0.73 0.75
Panel B: Relative Volatility Changes with Home Bias
Home Bias (α) 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
SD of RER
SD of GDP
Ξs=0.1 0.82 1.16 1.79 2.75 2.92
Ξs=0.2 0.71 1.00 1.54 1.97 1.61
Ξs=0.5 0.50 0.73 1.07 1.00 0.65
Optimal 0.20 0.95 1.74 2.90 4.50
Note :
–Model statistics are the average of 100 simulations. All artiﬁcial data from simulations are logged and H-P
ﬁltered with a smoothing parameter of 1600.












except for the row of Optimal (last row). The
row of Optimal shows results under optimal monetary policy.
30Figure 1: Welfare as a function of Ξπ


















Figure 2: Impulse Response Functions of the Terms of Trade to Technology Shock








Sticky Price & No Ex. Rate Targeting
Sticky Price with Ex. Rate Targeting
Note:
















31Figure 3: IRFs with and without Exchange Rate Stabilization




















(a) Impulse Response Functions to Technology Shock






















(b) Impulse Response Functions to UIP shock
Note:
–The plots with asterisks are results from benchmark model without exchange rate stabilization (Ξπ = 1.5 and Ξs = 0).
–The plots with circles are results from benchmark model with exchange rate stabilization (Ξπ = 1.5 and Ξs = 0.1).
32Figure 4: Scatter Diagram of REER and Relative REER Volatility against Openness









(a) Volatility of REER vs. Openness









(b) Volatility of relative REER vs. Openness
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